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I.  TRANSCENDENCE?  IN LAW? 
One of many fascinating facts about Pope Benedict XVI, fomerly 
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, is that he has engaged many of the problematics 
that are the meat and potatoes of contemporary Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  Whether the world knows it or not, we face a Pope who 
has written about the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, the political 
philosophy of Jacques Maritain, the ironies of Richard Rorty, and the 
significance of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science for what one can 
reasonably expect people to hold as true and live by in a pluralist democracy.1  
 * John F. Scarpa, Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, 
Villanova University School of Law.  I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of 
John Wagner and Erin Galbally. 
 1. See, e.g., JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 53-
72 (Brian McNeil trans., 2006). 




In sum, this is a Pope who has inquired deeply into “What Keeps the 
World Together: the Prepolitical Moral Foundations of a Free State.”2 
Law’s Quandary was published only shortly before Ratzinger was 
elected to the Chair of Peter, so one can safely assume the man has not 
read Steven Smith’s jurisprudential gem.3  I suspect, though, that given 
the chance, Benedict would join the choruses praising Law’s Quandary,   
for at least this reason: Smith aims to offer a forthright reckoning with 
the contemporary social, and specifically legal and political, situation of 
the sort the Pope considers exigent: “Demythologization is urgently 
necessary so that politics can carry on its business in a genuinely rational 
way.”4 
The principal task Law’s Quandary sends itself is to perform, and to 
invite the reader to perform for himself, a “Socratic audit.”  The first 
question for the auditor is what do I judge to be real?  In other words, 
across the breadth of my living, what kinds of “things” do I affirm as 
part of reality?  What facts do I in fact find?  In practice, what do I 
affirm as real?  The second question makes the move from practice to 
(informal) theory.  What does my working theory of reality—my “ontological 
inventory,” as Smith nicely names it—contain?  That is, what are my 
operative assumptions about what kinds of “things” can and should be 
listed as among the real?  Unities, but not unicorns?  Substances, but not 
unities?  Et cetera.  The third question concerns the extent of the 
alignment between one’s theory and one’s practice?  Does my practice 
have the support of my theory?  Or is my practice—for good or ill—out 
in front of my theory?  Finally, and more specifically, does what we do 
in law have the support of our collective or respective ontological-
inventory, or—for good or ill—is our practice in law ahead of that 
inventory?  Every reader will have to decide for himself.  Realignment 
between practice and theory always remains a possibility. 
By way of the audit, Smith invites readers not to be satisfied with 
theories of law that do not square with what we seem inveterately 
committed to doing in law.  Gently, but firmly, Smith urges us not to be 
satisfied with philosophies that are not up to today’s tasks in law. 
Readers of these law review pages cannot but be familiar with the 
bleak jurisprudential vision conjured by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the 
“high priest” of a new “age of faith” in law.5  Grant Gilmore once 
observed that “For Holmes, the ‘path of the law’ cut a horizontal line 
 2. Id. at 31. 
 3. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004). 
 4. RATZINGER, supra note 1, at 18. 
 5. John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander, Introduction to 1 THE TEACHINGS OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY XXII (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006) (citing 
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977)). 
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between heaven and hell, between human sanctity and depravity.  Law 
served to keep society and its members from sliding into the abyss of 
hell.  But it could do nothing to guide its members in their ascent to 
heaven.”6  Holmes’s dreary dream of the law to be produced by “the 
man of statistics and the master of economics” has gone unfulfilled, of 
course, but meanwhile the “cynical acid” has done its corrosive work in 
Holmes’s “well-known profession.”7  
Among many in the mainstream who continue to esteem law’s work, 
any “quandary” in law amounts to no more than the following: “How are 
we to meet the requirement that the law’s demands be defensible not as 
an expression of will, or power, but as a reasonable accommodation of 
the diverse needs and interests of people living together in a community?”8  
The preceding quotation from Lloyd Weinreb is his restatement—his 
downsizing, if you will—of law’s quandary.  It trades on an ontological 
inventory that is lean indeed: reasonable accommodation, diverse needs 
and interests, and people living together in community. 
As fingered by Smith, law’s quandary is as follows: 
Since at least the time of Holmes, lawyers and legal thinkers have scoffed at the 
notion that “the law” exists in any substantial sense or that it is not reducible 
into our discourse and practices.  Law is not a “brooding omnipresence in the 
sky.”  We have rejected any such conception of law . . . because we perceive, 
correctly, that our ontological inventories (or at least those that prevail in most 
public and academic settings) could not provide any intelligible account of . . . 
this “preexisting thing called ‘The Law.’”  At the same time, . . . [there is] 
cogent evidence suggesting that we still do believe in ‘the law.’ . . .  [O]ur 
actual practices seem pervasively to presuppose some such law: our practices at 
least potentially might make sense on the assumption that such a law exists, and 
they look puzzling or awkward or embarrassing without the assumption.9 
The lightning that strikes in Law’s Quandary is the insight that possibly, 
notwithstanding much (though by no means all) of what we say in law, 
in doing law we somehow experience what exceeds even the most 
reasonable accommodation, diverse needs and interests, et cetera, and 
this doing is strong evidence of what we actually believe.  This 
demythologization, not of a cynical or acidic sort, trades on the facts 
about our ongoing performance in law. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457, 462, 
469 (1897). 
 8. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Law’s Quest for Objectivity, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 711, 728 
(2006). 
 9. SMITH, supra note 3, at 62-63. 




“‘It is too often overlooked,’” says Joseph Vining, as quoted by Smith, 
“‘that law is evidence of view and belief far stronger than academic 
statement and introspection can provide.’”10  Vining discerns that in 
doing law, we encounter the “transcendent.”11  Commenting on Law’s 
Quandary, William Wagner explains that “Smith’s argument is mystagogical,” 
by which Wagner means that the argument “describe[s] and focus[es] 
the attention of each individual in his concrete existence on those 
experiences in which he in his individuality had the experience of 
transcendence and of being taken up out of himself into the ineffable 
mystery.”12  This demythologization is capacious. 
Transcend and its cognates are nice Latin inheritances that,  
unfortunately, have been bowdlerized in English-language Euro-speak 
that shares little common ground with the Christian tradition’s teaching 
about the ways in which the person created in the image and likeness of 
God is capable of “transcendence.”  Charles Taylor wrestled with this 
problem in an illuminating way in replying to a criticism of his use of 
the word transcendent in his essay A Catholic Modernity?: 
How could I ever have used such an abstract and evasive term, one so redolent 
of the flat and content-free modes of spirituality we can get maneuvered into in 
the attempt to accommodate both modern reason and the promptings of the 
heart?  I remember erasing it with particular gusto.  Why ever did I reinstate it?  
What pressures led in the end to its grudging rehabilitation? 
Well, one was that I wanted to say something general, something not just about 
Christians.  In the end, I think there is a point one could make about the 
insufficiency of human flourishing as the unique focus of our lives, which 
recurs throughout all of human history and cultures, albeit in very different 
ways.  In this sense, there is something unique in our modern “secular,” 
Western culture, in that it is the site of the only large-scale attempt in human 
history at living an exclusive humanism.  The self-congratulatory discourse 
about our exceptional status on this score is right in this respect: no one else 
ever tried it.  And by virtue of living through this experiment, we will be in a 
better position to understand why.  I needed a term to talk about all those 
different ways in which religious discourse and practice went beyond the 
exclusively human, and in exhaustion I fell back on “transcendent.”  (But I 
haven’t given up hope of finding a better term.)13 
 10. Id. at 171 (quoting JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP 5 (1995)) 
(alteration omitted).  If you have not read Vining’s From Newton’s Sleep, you should.  
Mary Ann Glendon’s blurb on the book’s jacket is exactly right: “Vining finds surprising 
treasures hidden in lawyers’ ways of knowing.”  That the author of Law’s Quandary 
questions the authenticity of some of the “treasures” only enriches things. 
 11. Id. at 173 (quoting VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP, supra note 10, at 157, 
222). 
 12. William Joseph Wagner, Law’s Quandary: An Echo of the Infinite, A Glimpse 
of the Unfathomable, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 655, 657 n.18 (2006) (quoting KARL RAHNER, 
FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH 59 (William V. Dych trans., 1978)). 
 13. Charles Taylor, Concluding Reflections and Comments, in A CATHOLIC MODERNITY? 
105-06 (James L. Heft ed., 1999). 
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Taylor is right: For those who do not wish to name God, count His 
commandments, or conform to the natural law He has instilled in us, but 
nonetheless would like to live in a world that exceeds what we see when 
we look around, “transcendence” is a bespoke suit. 
Smith is more linguistically parsimonious than Taylor or Vining: 
“transcendent” appears in Law’s Quandary only in oratione obliqua.  Is 
the parsimony merely linguistic?  Does Smith in fact pursue mystagogy, 
as Wagner suggests?  There is no parsimony in mystagogy.  Smith finds 
Joseph Vining’s “reflections” on how our practice of law points to and 
presupposes “something (or rather someone) transcendent” to be not 
“wholly persuasive.”14 
Smith ponders but then rejects the possibility that we are in collective 
bad faith in law, like clergy who lost their faith but do not renounce their 
benefices.15  Smith then pursues the alternative possibility that our 
practice is in good faith, though our philosophies limp.16  Law’s Quandary 
ends with this: “[W]e would perhaps be wise to confess our confusion 
and to acknowledge that there are richer realities and greater powers in 
the universe than our meager modern philosophies have dreamed of.”17  
Smith is, then, a demythologizer, but only to a point.  He certainly does 
not describe or name what he counsels us to acknowledge. 
The reader might wonder whether she has by misadventure landed in 
the suburban neighborhood of those “flat and content-free modes of 
spirituality we can get maneuvered into in the attempt to accommodate 
both modern reason and the promptings of the heart[.]”18  Reading Law’s 
Quandary, Justice Scalia found himself “sorely tempted to leap up and 
cry out, ‘Say it, man!  Say it!  Say the G-word!  G-G-G-G-God!”19 
However, the G-word and the real God it might name would not as 
such resolve the quandary Smith discerns.  Even assuming God exists, it 
remains a question whether He empowers mortal man to make law.  God 
exists and ants live in impressively ordered colonies, but no one supposes 
that ants can legislate.  I return to this below. 
 14. Steven D. Smith, Metaphysical Perplexity?, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 639, 653 (2006). 
 15. SMITH, supra note 3, at 159-64. 
 16. Id. at 179. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Taylor, supra note 13, at 105. 
 19. Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 687, 694 (2006). 




After seven chapters and an epilogue, the reader will make up his own 
mind as to what Smith has shown.  I agree with Vining: “Smith’s book 
runs like a horse.  It runs and takes us with it because there is such a 
voice in it, that brings us as readers closer to the subject of the search he 
undertakes, ‘performatively’ as it were.”20  The argument from performance 
and the threat of operative self-contradiction are, though not a panacea, 
frequently the strongest hold we have in establishing law’s claims.21  
They trade on the fact that, though one may like to play the fool, in 
the end, one likes to do things intelligently.22  Smith underutilizes the 
argument from performance, of which Vining is the master. 
I find myself in complete agreement with Smith and Vining when they 
aver that our practice of law is not explicable in terms of post-Holmesian 
positivist commitments.  I also agree with them that what we do in law is 
frequently better evidence of what we believe than is what we say.  I 
find myself slipping off, though, or trying to reign in the “runaway 
steed,”23 when the suggestion emerges that law, of the good old-fashioned, 
pre-Holmesian sort, is of a “substantial” sort.24 
Smith is cagey and mostly non-commital about exactly how we ought 
to conceive of “the law,” that “higher law” that he suggests is necessary 
if we are to make sense of what we in fact do in law.  What commitments 
he adumbrates, though, seem to be in the direction of something that is, 
first, too “substantial” and, second, at the same time, too “high.”  William 
Wagner’s suggestion that Smith has in mind a kind of “transcendental 
positivism” is intriguing, for it calls attention to Smith’s implicit demand 
for some-thing beneath or behind humans’ positing of law.25 
In common parlance, “substance” both connotes and denotes a res 
extensa, a something that, because it is physical, is substantial or sturdy.  
This train of thought, which would limit the real to the physical, rules 
out love, value, and meaning, as well as law.  The classical tradition 
knew better, in ways I shall elaborate.  What we do in law does not 
presuppose some kind of cosmic furniture that no longer appears on our 
ontological inventories.  Nor do our legal practices require for their 
legitimacy that they conform to an “overarching reality,”26 as Smith 
styles it.  Rather, what our practices presuppose and what gives them the 
 20. Joseph Vining, Law’s Own Ontology: A Comment on Law’s Quandary, 55 
CATH. U. L. REV. 695 (2006). 
 21. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human 
Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 227, 274-76 (2002). 
 22. See id. at 228. 
 23. Wagner, supra note 12, at 662. 
 24. SMITH, supra note 3, at 62. 
 25. Wagner, supra note 12, at 665. 
 26. SMITH, supra note 3, at 47. 
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legal legitimacy of which they are capable is much more ordinary.  
However, they are still not simply (to vary Taylor’s phrase) what is 
exclusively human or (more technically) natural. 
What I shall argue, more specifically, is that, on the view of traditional 
Catholic philosophy and theology, we cannot be in a true quandary in 
law, because—whether we readily admit it or fiercely deny it—we have 
received, and therefore can make, law.  On the traditional Catholic view, 
it is a fact about who we are that we are capable of making law.  While 
the Catholic tradition denies, then, that we are in an ontic (as opposed to 
ontological) quandary, it also acknowledges that the mainstream, “meager” 
ontologies of our making  can undermine our resources for  making the 
law of which we are capable.  In acknowledging the ways in which we 
are ontologically (as opposed to ontically) hobbled, and trying to help us 
overcome them, however, Pope Benedict sometimes seems to flirt with a 
deeper quandary in law, a genuinely ontic quandary.  Smith and Benedict 
thus converge in an unexpected way. 
II. PRACTICAL REASON AND VENN DIAGRAMS 
Driving Smith’s suggestion that there remains more to law than 
Holmes allowed is the observation that, more than half a century after 
“the ostensible demise of Swift v. Tyson, lawyers and judges still in 
practice treat prior decisions as if they were evidence of something more 
subtle and coy and unitary–of ‘the law.’”27  Smith might have added that 
even statutes–the quintessence of modern legal practice–are treated as 
evidence of what the law is, not as the law itself.28  And the text of the 
Constitution, too, is sometimes treated as confirming legal realities that 
precede legal text altogether.29  The resulting contention, then, would be 
that we practice law as if the practice depended on more than a selection 
among or interpretation of posited legal materials. 
“At the heart of much modern legal thought,” Smith observes, “has 
been the concern to address a central, ongoing challenge: the challenge 
 27. Id. at 57. 
 28. Compare Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (ignoring A.P.A. section 706(2)(A)’s directive that a reviewing court “shall 
set aside” unlawful agency action), with Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (holding A.P.A. section 706(2)(A) mandatory on its face). 
 29. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on 
the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 182-83 (criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s selective departure from textualism in favor of “sovereign immunity”). 




of explaining how the law makes sense without ‘the law.’”30  Smith 
divides the responses to this apparent phenomenon⎯the persistence of 
lawyers’ and judges’ pursuit of law that lies behind or above the posited 
legal materials⎯into two camps.  The first affirms that Holmes’s “well-
known profession” is understandable in its own right: “[w]e can and 
should understand the legal enterprise on its own terms and with reference 
to its visible functioning–not importing any extraneous disciplines, and a 
fortiori not referring to any spooky metaphysical entities such as ‘the 
law.’”31  Lloyd Weinreb would seem to agree.32 
The second response denies the claim that the legal enterprise is 
sufficient unto itself: “[t]he ‘law and’ strategy,” as Smith calls it, 
considers that “[t]he law needs supplementation. . . .  That substitute 
might be ‘policy,’ or ‘policy science.’  It might be moral philosophy.  Or 
perhaps pragmatism, or judgment, or practical reason.  In any case, the 
law is like the tango: it takes two.”33  Richard Posner thinks Swift v. 
Tyson34 was based on an epistemological error, but perhaps the positivism 
presupposed by Erie v. Tompkins35 turns out to be the error?36 
Smith observes, and I consider the observation (which he takes from 
Norman Cantor) to be mostly correct, that “[t]he ways in which lawyers 
and judges (and even most legal scholars) actually practice and talk 
about law are not so different than they were a century ago—or even 
five centuries ago.”37  Those ways are not, of course, univocal.  There 
was a hundred years ago, we have to admit, the phase of Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, during which legal doctrines were made to appear 
as self-moving marionettes with the men and women, whose laws they 
were, hardly to be seen.38  And Langdell was not sui generis; Blackstone 
before him had declared that judges were “living oracles” of a fully 
wrought law that they merely discovered.39  Today, the Restatement 
project sometimes seems to treat law as having its own two feet.40 
On the whole, however, the Anglo-American legal tradition has 
tended (if often unselfconsciously and inarticulately) toward an 
 30. SMITH, supra note 3, at 65. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Weinreb, supra note 8. 
 33. SMITH, supra note 3, at 65-66. 
 34. Smith v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938). 
 35. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 36. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 426 n.4 (1990). 
 37. SMITH, supra note 3, at 1. 
 38. See Brennan, supra note 21, at 243-49. 
 39. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *69. 
 40. Judge Noonan has observed the irony in the American Law Institute’s founders’ 
emphasis on the character of the project managers.  JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND 
MASKS OF THE LAW 139-51(1976). 
BRENNAN.DOC 6/5/2007  1:50:21 PM 
[VOL. 44:  97, 2007]  A (Qualified) Catholic Denial 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 105 
 
understanding according to which, in the famous expression of Lord 
Coke, “‘Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itselfe is 
nothing else but reason.’”41  “By ‘reason,’ Coke . . . did not mean the 
natural reason of an individual, but a kind of group or ‘corporate’ 
reason.”42  Reason, the life of the law, is “an artificial[] perfection of 
reason, gotten by long study, observation and experience, . . . fined and 
refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men. . . .’”43 
Human law was never making its own bloody entrance ex proprio 
vigore.  Individuals diachronically engaged in practical reasoning were 
bringing common sense and learning to bear on problems that called 
for legal solution.  That accretion over centuries was possible because 
individuals were using their own reason one by one to fine and refine, 
cumulatively and progressively, what was handed down to them and 
their contemporaries. 
This is a story Mary Ann Glendon has told beautifully, and I shall not 
repeat it here.44  The crucial premise is that, although Anglo-American 
treatise writers and judges have sometimes been reluctant to admit as 
much, most people engaged in law in the common law tradition have 
understood themselves to be engaged in an intergenerational chain of 
practical reasoning.  Individuals turning to precedents, statutes, and other 
sources in order to come to judgment as to the law on a particular point 
are looking for distilled practical wisdom. 
If we were to cast this in terms of Venn diagrams, I would say, with 
two qualifications to be introduced shortly, that what we have is not 
“practical reason” supplementing “law,” but “law” as a subset of “practical 
reason.”  Law is that subset of practical reasoning that is promulgated to, 
and potentially given coercive effect for, the common good of the 
community.  The first qualification would be that, obviously, sometimes 
people engaged in practical reasoning in the name of the law draw on 
theoretical reason, as when a bureaucrat at the Environmental Protection 
Agency relies on scientific data when drafting a rule regarding treatment 
 41. See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance, in 10 LONERGAN 
WORKSHOP 119, 129 (Fred Lawrence ed., 1994) (quoting 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE 
FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 138 (97b)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND, § 138 (97b) (The Legal Classics Library 1985). 
 44. See Glendon, supra note 41, at 119-44. 




of whitefish so as to reduce the risk of botulism.45  The rule is a piece of 
practical reasoning for the good of the potential whitefish-eating 
community, and its quality is in part a function of whether the science 
behind it is sound. 
My reason for rejecting the “law and practical reasoning” strategy, 
then, is that human/positive law already was or is a piece of practical 
reasoning: there’s no “and” about it. 
Smith’s principal reason for rejecting this strategy is different.  Smith 
concedes that practical reason is at work in law, but suspects that what 
we do in law cannot adequately be accounted for as an exercise in 
practical reason.  Smith points out ways in which rules of substantive 
and procedural law with which we in fact work are ill-adapted means for 
solving our actual practical problems.46  He points to a “practical 
inefficacy of law’s distinctive discourse.”47  To one scholar’s observation 
that precedents convey “a wealth of data for decision-making,” Smith 
replies, in sum, that there are or might be better ways of transmitting apt 
data for decision-making in law.48  I would reply to Smith that the 
imperfection of our legal methods is not evidence that they are not 
methods of practical reasoning 
There is more to say about this.  Another of Smith’s reasons for 
rejecting the thesis that what we do in law can be adequately explained 
as practical reason in action is that people use practical reason all the 
time, as “business executives, arbitrators, school teachers and principals, 
coaches, parents,” but in no other practical field do we witness “the 
specific and extraordinary treatment of precedent and text that is so 
conspicuous in legal discourse.”49  Smith is certainly right that law’s 
methods are unique; but then, our purposes in law are unique.  Coaches, 
parents, business executives, whatever their authority and responsibility 
within their respective spheres, have neither responsibility for the 
common good of all nor the coercive power of the state behind them.  
The common good’s depending, as it does, on both stable rules and the 
capacity for disciplined, creative adjustment goes a long way toward 
justifying the common law method and a common law approach to both 
statute law and constitutional law.  And again, the imperfection of our 
legal methods hardly subtracts from their being, in fact, methods of 
practical reasoning. 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d 
Cir. 1977). 
 46. SMITH, supra note 3, at 93. 
 47. Id. at 92-93. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 95. 
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Smith also mentions Larry Alexander’s observation that, on a given 
issue, it is possible that the Harvard philosophy faculty will have better 
“moral judgment” than the inherited legal materials offer.50  We can 
leave the remoteness of the possibility to one side, because there are 
multiple other reasons for denying that this possibility undermines the 
claim that our legal practice is an exercise in practical reason.  One is 
that law is not, and no one claims that it is, a given body politic’s 
undifferentiated exercise in practical reason.  Law springs from the body 
politic’s successful desire to see a cumulative and progressive growth, 
rather than an unpredictable or erratic alteration.  As Aquinas observed, 
animate justice would be ideal, but in the real world, prudence requires 
division of function and creation of office.51  The historical preference 
for judge-made law over statute-law reflects in part a fear of erratic 
alteration of what should be tested by experience and critical reflection 
thereon.  The increasing predominance of statute law reflects, for its 
part, a desire for law that is made by those who are more democratically 
accountable (than judges), certainly not something to which the Harvard 
philosophy faculty would be caught making claim. 
III.  “NATURAL LAW” AS LAW 
To what I have been arguing—that what we do in the name of the law 
is a subset of human practical reasoning—it might be objected that 
practical reasoning as such cannot generate law.  The objection, more 
fully stated, would be that practical reason can only generate practical 
reasoning which, though it may correctly identify worthy ends and well-
calibrated means, cannot claim for those results that they are “law.”  As 
mentioned above, fathers, mothers, and coaches engage in practical 
reasoning and then impose conclusions on their charges, yet it would be 
eccentric to regard the imposition of these conclusions as enforcing 
legislation. 
The objection is well taken, to a point.  The issue can be illuminated 
by exploring a lacuna in the legal landscape surveyed by Smith.  As we 
have seen, the quandary in which Smith finds us all is the result, on 
Smith’s view, of our no longer finding the classical premises plausible, 
at least not officially, while carrying on in law as if they still held.  “For 
 50. See id. 
 51. 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-II, Q. 95 Art. 1, 2 (Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947). 




many of us,” Smith explains, “the classical account is a distant memory; 
for others it is not even that.  So perhaps all we can confidently say is 
that the classical account, if it were admissible and believable, might be 
of some help.”52 
Smith considers that “[p]erhaps the most systematic working out” of 
the classical position “had been performed centuries before Blackstone 
or Story—by Thomas Aquinas.”53  I agree with this last judgment, but 
unfortunately Smith never gives the reader of Law’s Quandary the 
classical position as developed by Aquinas, and this omission becomes 
in turn a cause of Smith’s, and then potentially our own, disappointment 
with and distrust of law as a form of “practical reasoning.”  A more 
adequate restatement of the classical position, as held by Aquinas, can 
show what is right about the “practical reason” account of law, including 
why humans can make law (not just reach judgments of practical reason). 
Explicating what he understands to be Aquinas’s position, Smith 
reports that “human or positive law derives from the ‘eternal law,’ which 
is the divinely ordained order governing the universe, and positive law 
gains its status as law by virtue of participating in that order.”54  This is 
not quite right, or at least materially misleading, but before saying why, 
we should follow Smith, who quotes Aquinas as follows: 
Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor,’” 
Aquinas explained, “all the plans of government in the inferior governors must 
be derived from the eternal law.’  And it followed that ‘every human law has 
just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature.”55 
Smith next drops a footnote that glosses the just-quoted language of 
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: “The ‘natural law’ or law of nature is that 
part of the eternal law that is accessible to human reason without the aid 
of divine revelation.”56  With this gloss in place, Smith rounds out his 
summary of Aquinas’s position on human law’s relationship to higher 
law by quoting Aquinas’s admonition that “if in any point [the human 
law] deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion 
of law.”57 
Next, Smith anticipates “[a] possible misconception, which leads to a 
familiar and dismissive caricature, [that] must be guarded against here.  
The classical position as expounded by thinkers like Aquinas,” Smith 
continues, “did not naively suppose that there is, say, a sort of ghostly 
 52. SMITH, supra note 3, at 152. 
 53. Id. at 46. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 185 n.12. 
 57. Id. at 46. 
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Internal Revenue Code in all of its magnificent detail written in the 
heavens, and that the Code we find in our more terrestrial tax volumes is 
merely a mundane photocopy of the celestial original.”58  (Smith does have 
a way with words, not to mention a welcome sense of humor.)  Because 
we live after Holmes and his 1917 installation of the “brooding omnipresence 
in the sky” caricature of the natural law,59 this is a needful clarification.  
Continuing to try to explicate St. Thomas’s position, Smith explains: 
A few legal rules, such as the prohibition of homicide, might be derived directly 
from—“read off of,” as we say—the eternal law.  But the overwhelming bulk of 
positive law consists of the detailed specification, or determinatio, of what the 
eternal law gives only in generalities.  Such specifications are the product of 
judgments by human legislators, whose pronouncements have the status of law.  
Even so, the legal status of such pronouncements depends on their indirect 
derivation from the eternal law, and they should be understood and interpreted 
in accordance with that overarching reality.60 
In my judgment, the quoted paragraph clarifies but also obscures and 
mis-describes. 
The important clarification that Smith makes here, against the damage 
done by the misrepresentation entrenched in the collective memory by 
Holmes’s “brooding omnipresence,” is that, on Aquinas’s understanding, 
most of the particular decisions or rules implemented by humans as law 
are humanly-wrought determinationes, that is, determinations or specifications 
of matters left indeterminate or unspecified by “higher” law.61  There 
may be some people who once believed, and there certainly are great 
jurists who said, that the whole body of human law is found, not made.  
But by now, however, as Mary Ann Glendon says, “[N]o American adult 
needs to be told that we live under a rule of men in the sense that laws 
are made, interpreted, and administered by real men and women.”62  This 
is as it should be, but it does not follow that those with responsibility for 
governing the body politic through law are not obligated by (even if, 
alas, they ignore) a “higher” law. 
The lacuna in Smith’s account concerns the natural law.  Indeed, in 
my judgment, Law’s Quandary never gives us the natural law as 
understood by Aquinas and the central tradition following him.  A 
principal reason the reader of Law’s Quandary may be led to sympathize 
 58. Id. at 47. 
 59. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 60. SMITH, supra note 3, at 47. 
 61. Id. at 62-63. 
 62. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 10 (1994). 




with Smith’s quandary is, specifically, the omission of the natural law, 
the very law that, if “higher,” is also within (though not the same as) our 
very selves.63 
The omission enters from a number of angles, and Smith has help.  In 
the text of Aquinas glossed by Smith, in which Smith identifies the 
“natural law” with the “law of nature,” the translator (not Smith) has 
misleadingly rendered Aquinas’s “lex naturalis,” (natural law) as “law 
of nature.”  Occasionally, Aquinas does write “lex naturae,” law of nature, 
where one would expect lex naturalis. 
However, natural law is not, on Aquinas’s account, a mere metaphorical 
periphrasis for “nature” or for the statistical regularities that are observable 
in nature.  On Aquinas’s account, natural law is truly law, and this means 
that when we come to make positive law, there is already law at hand to 
guide us. 
This idea, that morality is itself legal, that is, in the form of law, is 
almost totally foreign to the modern mind.  As Aquinas sees things, 
however, the providential God has promulgated a genuine law in (and 
for) us, a prospect wholly absent from the cosmology of nature 
bequeathed by Aristotle to Aquinas.  The whole movement of Aquinas’s 
thought as concerns lex naturalis is to establish the going forth of an 
ordinance of reason from the divine mind to human rational animals for 
their acceptance in freedom.  At the risk of getting ahead of ourselves, 
we can say that the “natural law” is our participation in and continuance 
of the divine governance itself, nothing less and nothing more—not a 
myth, not a vague invocation of transcendence. 
What Aquinas means by “law” is both clear and steady.  He defines 
law as “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who 
has care of the community, and promulgated.”64  Mind is the only true 
location of law.  Law is primarily in the mind of the lawgiver/legislator 
and secondarily in the mind of the one who is ruled.  Strictly speaking, 
law is always and only in reason or in the mind, in intellectu.  As Russell 
Hittinger explains, “In a very extended sense of the term (per similitudine[m]) 
law is ‘in’ things devoid of reason: the law books, the red light, the 
physical flow of traffic itself.”65  Strictly speaking, the only place law is 
 63. William Wagner remarks on Smith’s “curious silence” about “St. Thomas’s 
jurisprudence fit[ting] within the sub-variety Smith terms ‘Law and (or as) practical reason.’”  
Wagner, supra note 12, at 675.  See also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Law, Natural Law, 
and Human Intelligence:Living the Correlation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 731, 756 (2006).  
Smith’s silence becomes less curious as one grasps the lack, in the classical landscape as 
Smith reconstructs it, of a natural law that is accessible as practical reason’s measure. 
 64. AQUINAS, supra note 51, at Pt. I-II, Q. 90 Art. 4 (emphasis added). 
 65. RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE 96 (2003). 
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“in” is the intellect.  “Substantial” this is not, though without threat to its 
reality. 
What exactly, then, is the “natural law”—which, I contend, Smith 
never gives us? 
[L]aw, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as 
in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and 
measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure.  Wherefore, since all 
things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, . . . it 
is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, 
namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to 
their proper acts and ends.  Now among all others, the rational creature is 
subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes 
of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others.  
Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural 
inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in 
the rational creature is called the natural law. . . .  [T]he light of natural reason, 
whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the 
natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light.  It is 
therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s 
participation of the eternal law.66 
The natural law is the rational creature’s participation in the eternal 
law, which in turn is the “very Idea of government of things in God the 
Ruler of the universe[.]”67  The natural law is not a law diverse from the 
eternal law—it is a participation thereof.  As such, it is not law in a 
diminished or qualified or metaphorical sense.  The natural law enjoys 
the nature of law “maxime.”68 
Aquinas never says that law is “in” nature, not even in individual 
occurrences of human nature.69  What makes the natural law “natural” is 
not its origin (which is divine), but the “mode of [its] promulgation and 
reception.”70  On Thomas’s view, law is an extrinsic principle of human 
nature: 
 66. AQUINAS, supra note 51, at Pt. I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2. 
 67. Id. at Pt. I-II, Q. 91, Art. 1. 
 68. “Lex . . .  naturalis maxime habet rationem legis.”  SANCTI THOMAE DE 
AQUINO, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE Pt. I-II, Q. 90 Art. 4 (Alba 1962).  This assertion occurs in 
one of the objections, so it cannot without more be taken to state Thomas’s own view.  
The reply to the objection neither denies nor qualifies the assertion, and this in the 
context of the very article in which Thomas first advances his complete definition of law.  
See Stephen L. Brock, The Legal Character of Natural Law According to St. Thomas 
Aquinas (1988) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto). 
 69. HITTINGER, supra note 65, at 97. 
 70. Id. 




[L]aw properly exists in a mind.  Law is an extrinsic principle because it is not a 
predicate of human nature.  Man is a rational animal, but he is not a law.  
Therefore, the use of the word nature (natura, naturalis, naturale, naturaliter) 
in connection with law is meant to highlight how the intrinsic principles of 
human nature receive or hold the legal measure.71 
We need not delay here over the particulars of the mode of the 
promulgation and reception, as the crucial point for filling up the gap in 
Smith’s account of Aquinas’ classical position is that every rational 
person is possessed of a genuine law according to which he can and is 
obligated to make practical judgments. 
Using his practical reason, the person does not simply reason about 
nature or something else; he does, or he should, conform to the natural 
law that is his participation in the divine providence (and, to the extent 
the natural law is under-determinative, go on to give it determinatio).  
As Jacques Maritain explains, 
What emerges from [Thomas’s doctrine] . . . is that the Natural Law is known 
by human reason, but that human reason, in its rational exercise, has no part in 
its establishment.  The divine reason alone is the author of Natural Law.  It 
alone causes that Law to exist, and it alone causes it to be known, insofar as it is 
the cause of human nature and of its essential inclinations.  Let us say . . . that 
here the divine reason is the only reason to be considered.  The law, in effect, is 
essentially an ordinance of reason (ordinatio rationis), so that without an 
ordering reason there is no law.  The notion of law is essentially bound up with 
that of an ordering reason. 
  . . . . 
The fact that the divine reason is the only reason which is author of the Law 
enables us to understand better the meaning of Saint Thomas’ expression: 
Natural Law is a participation in the Eternal Law. It is the divine reason which 
is involved.  If human reason had a hand in it, the Law would, to that extent, 
have no more than the value of human authority.72 
Smith raised–and rejected–the possibility that law as we practice it needs 
to be supplemented with something other than law.  The second qualification 
I would add to my thesis that law is a subset of practical reason is this: 
practical reason can proceed to make law by judging in conformity with 
the natural law.  Or, to reverse the point, law–the natural law–needs to 
be known and given effect by practical reason.  As observed above, law 
was never entering ex proprio vigore; the law always depends, for its 
entrance into human living, on the exercise of practical reason and the 
antecedent free choice of the will. 
To Smith’s assertion, quoted above, that “human or positive law 
derives from the ‘eternal law,’” one can reply by quoting Aquinas: “[I]n 
 71. Id. at 301 n.17. 
 72. Jacques Maritain, Natural Law and Moral Law, in MORAL PRINCIPLES OF 
ACTION 62, 66-67 (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., 1952). 
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temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn 
from the eternal law.”73  On Aquinas’s account, however, man does as 
much principally74 by reaching practical judgments in conformity with 
the natural law, which is “higher” law in the sense that the pedigree of 
the legislation is divine, but which is received and held right here in 
terra firma, and more specifically, in intellectu.  When legislators pass 
true laws, they do as much (on Aquinas’s account) through using their 
practical reason to reach judgments that implement (by being in 
conformity with) the natural law.  To Smith’s assertion that “positive 
law consists of the detailed specification . . . of what the eternal law 
gives only in generalities,”75 I would reply that positive law consists of 
the detailed specification of what the natural law gives only in 
generalities; the eternal law itself contains every last detail of creation 
(both God’s antecedent will for his rational creatures and, in view of 
their free choices, his consequent will). 
The second qualification to be added to my above-claim that law is a 
subset of practical reasoning is, again, that what we do in law is 
practical reasoning about the natural law (and, to the extent it is 
under-determinative, about what is necessary or desirable to give it 
determinatio).  The natural law is the object of practical reason, not a 
mere complement to a hitherto-incomplete act.  Whatever the adequacy 
or inadequacy of prevailing ontologies, there is no ontic gap: God has 
legislated in His creatures, and they are equipped with practical reason 
by which to know that law and give it effect in their living, including 
through the creation and enforcement of positive law.  That law, though 
hardly substantial, is in the human intellect, having first been in the 
divine mind. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING THE NATURAL LAW 
This was the view of lawmaking that predominated in Catholic social 
doctrine until recently, and it had radiating consequences that may not 
jump to mind.  Some of these are important for understanding the currently 
available Catholic positions vis-à-vis Law’s Quandary. 
 73. AQUINAS, supra note 51, at Pt. I-II, Q. 93 Art. 3. 
 74. “Principally,” but not exclusively, because he also does so with reference to 
divine positive law. 
 75. SMITH, supra note 3, at 47. 




First, there is an implication that is nothing short of “radical.”76  Every 
rational creature is in fundamentally the same position vis-à-vis the 
natural law, and that position is, as one might say, empowering.  “Every 
created intelligence,” as Hittinger observes of St. Thomas’s account, 
[N]ot only has a competence to make judgments, but to make judgments 
according to a real law–indeed, a law that is the form and pattern of all other 
laws.  Thus, the legal order of things does not begin with an acquired virtue, 
possessed by a few; nor does it begin with the offices and statutes of human 
positive law; nor does it begin with the law revealed at Sinai.  God speaks the 
law, at least in its rudiments, to every intelligent creature.77 
Every rational person’s being equally in position to reach a judgment 
according to a true law entails, at one level, a radical equalitarianism.  Every 
rational person is, in virtue of his or her opportunity and obligation to act 
according to her or his participated share in the eternal law, engaged in the 
divine governance.  Justice Scalia is of the view that “God applies the natural 
law.”78  Thomas Aquinas understands that God entrusts that work to all of us. 
From this it does not follow, however, that the function or office of 
making and enforcing law falls to everyone equally.  The body politic 
must create functions or offices, and those who possess them are limited 
both by the metes and bounds of their respective offices and by the 
natural law.  Legislators, judges, and executives have their specific roles 
to fulfill, and exactly what those are turns on the particulars of the 
particular polity.  What does not turn on the particulars of the particular 
polity is that usurpation of authority that has not been assigned is always 
“an offense against the common good.”79  Everyone has the capacity to 
reach judgments according to the natural law, but only some have the 
power to make, adjudicate, or enforce law for the body politic.  Everyone, 
in virtue of his or her natural law sharing in the eternal law, is a 
participant in the divine rule.  Those possessed of office are participants 
in the divine rule in a special way. 
According to Pope Leo XIII (r. 1878-1903), who gave modern 
Catholic social doctrine its classic formulation, “in civil society, God has 
always willed that there should be a ruling authority, and that they who 
are invested with it should reflect the divine power and providence in 
some measure over the human race.”80  “Authority,” Leo explains, 
 76. HITTINGER, supra note 65, at 98. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. J., U.S. Supreme Court, The Common Christian Good, 
Speech at the Gregorian University Symposium on Left, Right, and the Common Good 
(May 2, 1996), transcript available at http://www.learnedhand.com/scalia.htm. 
 79. HITTINGER, supra note 65, at 103. 
 80. Encyclical by Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, sec. 4 (Nov. 1, 1885), available 
at http://www.dailycatholic.org/immordei.htm. 
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is the one and only foundation of all law—the power, that is, of fixing duties 
and defining rights, [and so forth].  But all this, clearly, cannot be found in man, 
if, as his own supreme legislator, he is to be the [supreme] rule of his own 
actions.  It follows, therefore, that the law of nature is the same thing as the 
eternal law, implanted in rational creatures, and inclining them to their right 
action and end; and can be nothing else but the eternal reason of God, the 
Creator and Ruler of the world.81 
On Leo’s understanding, all ruling power—all authority—is ad imaginem 
Dei.  Humans receive a share in the divine rule, and it falls to them freely 
to mirror it and give it effect in temporal affairs.  All human government is 
under divine law and, as such, it enjoys a majesty and dignity that exceed 
merely human artifice.82  “No man,” Leo explained, 
has in himself or of himself the power of constraining the free will of others by 
fetters of authority . . . .  This power resides solely [unice] in God, the Creator 
and Legislator of all things; and it is necessary that those who exercise it should 
do so as having received it from God.83 
V.  BENEDICT AND THE WHITHER OF THE NATURAL LAW? 
Gradually but demonstrably, over the course of the last century-plus, 
Catholics, both popes and others, took leave of various parts of the 
Leonine synthesis that was in its essentials and particulars an updating 
and application of the political theology of Aquinas.84  For present 
purposes, we can fast forward to the current state of the story, where it 
becomes clear that Pope Benedict draws surprisingly close to Smith’s 
diagnosis of a quandary in law.  Relatedly, Benedict, like Smith–though 
for different reasons–does not quite give us the natural law as understood by 
Thomas and as developed and applied in Catholic social doctrine of the 
twentieth century, from Leo XIII through Pope John Paul II (r. 1978-
2004).  In evidence of this claim I draw on the writings of Benedict XVI 
and of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger. 
 81. Encyclical by Pope Leo XIII, Libertas, sec. 8 (June 20, 1888), available at 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/l13liber.htm. 
 82. This does not mean that human government is “sovereign,” at least as this 
English word is ordinarily understood.  See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Sovereign States? The 
State of the Question from a Catholic Perspective, in FAITH AND LAW (Robert Cochran 
ed., forthcoming 2007). 
 83. Encyclical by Pope Leo XIII, Diuturnum, sec. 11 (June 29, 1881), available at 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/l13civ.htm. 
 84. I have chronicled some of the major components of that decomposition in The 
Decreasing Ontological Density of the State in Catholic Social Doctrine.  See Patrick 
McKinley Brennan, The Decreasing Ontological Density of the State in Catholic Social 
Doctrine, 52 VILL. L. REV. 253 (2007) (Scarpa Symposium). 




In the first major teaching document of his pontificate, the encyclical 
letter Deus caritas est published in 2005, Pope Benedict invited 
Christians to reflect on the ways in which God’s love for man calls for 
individual persons to share that love with others, especially the needy.85  
In making way for love, so to speak, Benedict had occasion to clarify the 
scope and purposes of the state and of politics.  In identifying what is not 
the Church’s direct work, Benedict explained that “the formation of just 
structures . . . belongs to the world of politics, the sphere of the 
autonomous use of reason (rationis sui ipsius consciae).”86  This would 
have been an obvious and opportune place to mention the law in 
accordance with which practical reason reaches the judgments as to what 
structures are just.  There is no suggestion in the encyclical that the state 
and its officers are sharers in the divine rule through their natural law 
participation in the eternal law.  In derogation from this view, the work 
of politics is described as a work of practical reason: 
Justice is both the aim and intrinsic criterion of all politics.  Politics is more than 
a mere mechanism for defining the rules of public life: its origin and its goal are 
found in justice, which by its very nature has to do with ethics.  The State must 
inevitably face the question of how justice can be achieved here and now.  But 
this presupposes an even more radical question: what is justice?  The problem is 
one of practical reason . . . .87 
Is it not also one of natural law? 
Papal encyclicals are not philosophical treatises; “[t]hey possess a 
summary quality . . . due to their didactic purpose.”88  The result is that 
“[t]he scholarly commentator is therefore obliged to build upon the texts 
to bring forth from them a coherent, fuller treatment of the matters 
addressed therein.”89  Especially given that the primary topic of the 
encyclical was not the state, law, or society—but rather the demands of 
Christian charity—the silence may be a false signal. 
The term “natural law” is not wholly absent from the text of Deus 
caritas, after all.  By my count, it occurs exactly once, as Pope Benedict 
explains the basis of the Church’s teaching regarding what is in the 
responsibility of laity (not of the Church as such, or of her clergy) to 
pursue in politics and law.  “The Church’s social teaching,” Benedict 
explains, “argues on the basis of reason and natural law, namely, on the 
 85. Encyclical by Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, sec. 1 (Jan. 25, 2006), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ 
ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html. 
 86. Id. at sec. 29. 
 87. Id. 
 88. ROBERT P. GEORGE & GERARD V. BRADLEY, Pope John Paul II (1920-2005), 
in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 
220, 225 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2006). 
 89. Id. 
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basis of what is in accord with the nature of every human being” (a 
ratione et a naturali iure, id est ab eo quod congruit cuiusque personae 
humanae).”90  On the traditional understanding, the content of the 
natural law is indeed “what is accord with the nature of every human 
person;”91 it was also, however, a law.  Is this Benedict’s view?  The 
Latin phraseology of the encyclical enshrouds this issue, and the German 
(original) from which the Latin was prepared is of no help: “von der 
Vernunft und und vom Naturrecht her, das heist von dem aus, was allen 
Menschen wesensgemäss ist.”92 
What the encyclical leaves obscure seems clear in certain pre-
pontificate texts of Cardinal Ratzinger.  In a 1988 book that treats at length 
of political topics, Cardinal Ratzinger wrote that “Catholic theology has 
since the later Middle Ages, with the acceptance of Aristotle and his idea 
of natural law . . . .”93  The rest of the sentence does not matter for the 
present purpose.  Though Aristotle did, and exemplarily, have a concept 
of nature, Aristotle did not have a concept of natural law.  Lacking a 
concept of a personal ruling God, Aristotle had appeal to no norm higher 
than the conditions of the possibility of humans reaching their natural 
potential for flourishing.  Human law in Aristotle’s cosmos is in no way 
a function or product of a participation in a higher law. 
In a talk given at the Catholic Academy of Bavaria in January 2004, 
under the title, “What Keeps the World Together: The Prepolitical 
Foundations of a Free State,” Ratzinger set as his task to identify 
“genuinely evidential character—values sufficiently strong to provide 
motivation and sufficiently capable of being implemented . . . .”94  He 
then offered a brief (and, by his own admission, incomplete) history of 
natural law theorizing, mentioning Gratian, Ulpian, Vitoria, Pufendorf, 
Grotius, and others, but not Aquinas, and never the eternal law, and 
certainly not a doctrine of participation.95  (Recall that for Aquinas, 
natural law is not diverse from the eternal law).  Here is Cardinal 
Ratzinger’s statement, on that occasion, about the status of the natural 
law today: 
 90. Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 85, at sec. 28. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Encyclical by Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, sec. 28 (Dec. 25, 2005), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ 
ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_ge.html. 
 93. JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHURCH, ECUMENISM AND POLITICS 213 (1988). 
 94. RATZINGER, supra note 1, at 37. 
 95. Id. at 37-44. 




Natural law has remained—especially in the Catholic Church—one element in 
the arsenal of arguments in conversations with secular society and with other 
communities of faith, appealing to shared reason in the attempt to discern the 
basis of a consensus about ethical principles of law in a pluralistic, secular 
society.  Unfortunately, this instrument has become blunt, and that is why I do 
not wish to employ it to support my arguments in this discussion.  The idea of 
the natural law presupposed a concept of “nature” in which nature and reason 
interlock: nature itself is rational.  The victory of the theory of evolution has 
meant the end of this view of nature. . . .  [The] last surviving element [of the 
doctrine of natural law] is human rights. . . .  Perhaps the doctrine of human 
rights ought today to be complemented by a doctrine of human obligations and 
human limits.96 
The traditional doctrine of natural law requires that beings be intelligible 
by theoretical and practical reason; it also requires, however, that God 
have legislated in his rational creatures. 
Benedict’s practical concern is clear: the state that wrongly claims 
divine warrant is an enemy to be feared.  The Leonine state was to 
reflect to the world, as best it could, an image of the divine rule.  Today, 
according to Benedict, “Christian faith has dethroned the idea of a 
political theocracy.”97  The Pope continues, “[i]n modern terms, it has 
brought about the secularity of the state.”98  One way in which a state 
can be secular is for it not to prioritize or privilege any one religion or 
group of religions.  Another way for a state to be, or try to be, secular is 
not to trace its authority to God, not to understand itself as making law 
as an extension of and participation in the divine governance.  As 
envisaged by Benedict, the modern state is to do both. 
One of the leading notes of Benedict’s young pontificate is a clarion 
call to all people to use reason, rather violence, to solve problems and 
create a just social order.  The invitation to men and women of all faiths 
to plumb the depths of human reason and explore anew its capacities is 
welcome and urgently needed.  As theologian Frederick Lawrence 
explained some years ago, 
[T]he Church’s current activity in the intellectual sphere is not making sufficiently 
manifest how the basic thrust of Catholic Christianity is in harmony with full-
fledged intellectualism, let alone that intellectual life is integral to the Church’s 
mission.  The Church today needs to proclaim loud and clear that understanding 
the natural order of the cosmos in the human and subhuman sciences, and in 
philosophy and theology, is part of appreciating God’s cosmic Word expressed 
in creation.  It is part and parcel of the fullness of the Catholic mind and heart.99 
Benedict’s proclamation is loud and clear.  Its echoes, however, bring us 
into only the vestibule of a truly legal edifice.  Unless it receives a law, 
 96. Id. at 38-40. 
 97. Id. at 114. 
 98. Id. 
 99. MARY ANN GLENDON, TRADITIONS IN TURMOIL 430 (2006). 
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on what basis can human reason proceed to make law?  Has Benedict 
created—or, alternatively, acknowledged—a quandary in law? 
VI.  CREATION WITHOUT LAW? 
In the Gallic War, Julius Caesar reported (incorrectly, as it turns out),  
that among the Germans, theft was no longer considered wrong.  This 
German lapse later served St. Thomas Aquinas as an example of how a 
whole culture can lose knowledge of secondary precepts of the natural 
law.  Today a German is the Pope, and he seeks to remind the world of 
realities that it frequently overlooks or denies, including the potency of 
reason.  Today Smith suggests to students of Anglo-American law that 
“we would perhaps be wise to confess our confusion and to acknowledge 
that there are richer realities and greater powers in the universe than our 
meager modern philosophies have dreamed of.”100  What are these realities 
and powers, we might ask, and do they imbue in us a law by which to 
live?  Neither the Pope nor Smith considers recourse to the natural law, 
as traditionally understood, availing. 
It can hardly be denied that argument from “natural law” has become 
blunt, at least in the quarters where it might be most needed; people do 
not understand, and not understanding they cannot agree (or disagree).  
Sympathetic though it sets out to be, Smith’s summary of the classical 
position manages pretty much to eclipse the God-given basis for creating 
positive law.  People trying to make law solely on the basis of practical 
reasoning about nature may indeed get the content right (they may reach 
a correct judgment of practical reason), but, as Russell Hittinger has 
observed ominously: “Once the natural law is equated with the human 
power to make practical judgments, its specifically legal character as a 
received (or participated) law is muted, if not abandoned.”101 
So what?  When the “natural law” is understood not to be “a received 
(or participated) law,” there are two obvious consequences.  First, the 
human person understands himself or herself no longer to be under law 
(except perhaps divine positive law, such as the Ten Commandments).  On 
what basis, then, can he or she make law?  Reasonableness, accommodation, 
interests, and so forth are what they are, but are they a basis for a 
person’s or a community’s making law?  Can the lawless proceed to 
make law?  The appearance is one of lawlessness. 
 100. SMITH, supra note 3, at 179. 
 101. HITTINGER, supra note 65, at 46. 




Second, those who do not enjoy a participated share in the eternal law 
do not, therefore, enjoy a participated regality.  On the traditional view, 
the human’s share in the divine rule assured a majesty, a gravitas to law 
and politics, qualities not associated with “a reasonable accommodation 
of the diverse needs and interests of people living together in community.”  
Among the achievements of which the latter is structurally incapable is 
aiding man in his “ascent to heaven.” 
More dramatic, in the short run, is a third failure.  People who regard 
themselves as not under a received law may unwittingly violate that law.  
For present purposes, we can stipulate that it will be for God to settle the 
post-mortem consequences of involuntary violation of the natural law.  
However, no matter how forgiving God may (or may not) be, we can say 
with certainty that nature is strict—or, as the Model Penal Code prefers 
“absolute”—liability.  The terrestrial consequences of violating the natural 
law are palpable.  As Charles Taylor observed in the language quoted at 
the outset, we have not yet seen and felt the collective consequences of 
living an exclusive humanism.  What we have seen and are feeling, 
however, is that an exclusive humanism leads to a degraded view of the 
human.  As Pope Benedict has observed, “the attempt, carried to extremes, 
to shape human affairs to the total exclusion of God leads us more and 
more to the brink of the abyss, toward the utter annihilation of man.”102  
Short of “utter annihilation” are the little annihilations—the hungers, the 
starvations, the injustices of other sorts, as well as the apathy, the self-
loathing, and pointlessness of, say, Europe’s negative birth rate. 
Benedict’s response, which he sometimes describes as a “wager,”103 is 
this:  
In the age of the Enlightenment, the attempt was made to understand and define 
the essential norms of morality by saying that these would be valid etsi Deus 
non daretur, even if God did not exist.  In the situation of confessional 
antagonism and in the crisis that threatened the image of God, they tried to keep 
the essential moral values outside the controversies and to identify an evidential 
quality in these values that would make them independent of the many divisions 
and uncertainties of the various philosophies and religious confessions. . . .  We 
must [today] reverse the axiom of the Enlightenment and say: Even the one who 
does not succeed in finding the path to accepting the existence of God ought 
nevertheless to try to live and to direct his life veluti si Deus daretur, as if God 
did indeed exist.  This is the advice Pascal gave to his non-believing friends, 
and it is the advice that I should like to give to our friends today who do not 
believe.104 
 102. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 51 
(Brian McNeil trans., 2006). 
 103. Id. at 22. 
 104. Id. at 50-52. 
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Is this consistent with the de-mythologization project?  And, in any 
event, from God’s (as if) existence, what follows?  A God who does not 
legislate for his rational creatures?  St. Thomas thought that rational 
human creatures could by simple inference conclude that God was the 
author of their ability to discern right from wrong; only a “blameworthy 
stupidity”105 could prevent human agents from knowing that moral norms 
are binding in virtue of something higher than our human minds. 
American legislatures continue to legislate, judges continue to 
judge under just positive-laws, and executives continue to execute 
just positive-laws.  These facts demonstrate that, whatever our theories, 
our practice seems to hold up, at least in the main.  Individual agents and 
groups can reach correct judgments about the content of the natural law 
without understanding that they are doing as much, and go on to give 
those judgments coercive effect.  (Which is not to say that mistakes are 
not being made).  As the higher law framework recedes from consciousness, 
however, and human agents understand themselves to be producing laws 
without having first received law, the enterprise cannot but seem 
arbitrary, at least from the point of view of those against whom the laws 
are being enforced.  Smith was indeed on to something.  Moreover, although 
an ontological quandary does not entail an ontic quandary, an ontological 
quandary does increase the probability of ontic harm—people proceeding in 
disregard of what is ontically possible and exigent.  A world that waits 
for God to apply the natural law is in for chaos. 
There is no use repeating formulae that no longer appeal, a fact Pope 
Benedict appreciates.  Neither re-mystification nor false confession of 
confusion is availing.  Those informed by the natural law tradition will 
press on, one judgment at a time, confident that today’s emaciated ontologies 
do not deliver us to an ontically deficient world.  The program to be followed 
in law mirrors the one sketched by Bernard Lonergan, in another context: 
There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world 
that no longer exists.  There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by 
now this,  . . . now that new possibility.  But what will count is a perhaps not 
numerous center; big enough to be at home in both the old and new, [and] 
painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made . . . .106 
 105. HITTINGER, supra note 65, at 54. 
 106. Bernard Lonergan, Dimensions of Meaning, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD 
LONERGAN 245 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., 1988). 
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The common law method, informed by the natural law and driven by 
practical reason, was such a center.  Smith was right to capitalize on the 
implications of its survival.  Those implications, though, are at cross-
purposes with Smith’s cagey hope for a sort “transcendental positivism.” 
